Layer 1 · Overview
Risks and open questions - what could go wrong, what we do not know
The strongest objections to the plan, what survives each, the weak point of political feasibility, and the gaps in the evidence that later iterations should close.
On this page
A plan that has not been attacked has not been tested. This page gives the strongest objections in brief, with what survives each. The full versions are on objections and critique.
Why this page exists
The aim of this site is a prosperous Bangladesh that every group can contribute to. That is more likely if the plan is tested by those who doubt it. Where the evidence is disputed, we say so, and we say where our own judgement is weakest.
The strongest objections
| Objection | What survives |
|---|---|
| There is no neutral designer. The designer is the governing party, one of the forces itself | The plan does not need neutrality. It needs the leadership’s interests (a full term, a safe exit, a legacy, a budget that funds its promises) to line up with a few deals, plus outside deadlines for the rest. A thinner base than it first looks |
| Buying groups off entrenches them (the army, clerics, parties) | Sunset clauses and published accounts help, but the risk is real, which is why each deal states its price |
| Deals keep the country in a deals economy | Earlier growth ran on ordered deals, and nobody has shown a route to rules that skips deals. The test of each deal is whether it leaves a rule behind |
| Reform comes from dominant executives, not consensus | Georgia’s success came with weak democratic control. The synthesis: let the majority drive technocratic economic reform fast, but make the political rules a cross-party deal |
| The scores are invented | They are judgement; the method matters. For most re-scorings banks and the insurance pact still come first |
| Evidence from elsewhere may not travel | It shows officials respond to monitoring and payment design, not how large the effect is in Bangladesh. Hence pilots |
| The pain comes first. Bank resolution and austerity arrive while poverty is rising | Targeted transfers and candour on timing. Delay raises the bill |
| The world may not cooperate (energy prices, Gulf labour demand, trade partners) | The domestic half (banks, extortion, credibility) is worth doing in any scenario |
| This is a cyclical shock, not a structural crisis | Partly true short term, but the 2029 graduation clock, gas depletion and a falling female labour force are structural and dated |
| Deals can be captured (a window used to forgive friends) | Only publication and outside audit protect against this, and they depend on a free press |
| Pilots stay pilots | Tie scaling to the 2029 graduation date and to budget lines, not donor projects |
| It underrates religion | The evidence that madrasas respond to incentives is real but old; there is no recent trend data. The judgement held with least confidence, and most worth testing |
| A version of the first deal was just tried and repealed | The new design differs on exactly the points that sank it; whether that is enough is untested |
The weak point: who carries it out
The ground rules narrow this weakness but do not remove it; objections to the compact itself (that rules on paper do not bind, that law can be weaponised, “secularism by stealth”, forgetting victims) are on objections and critique.
Every deal asks someone to give up something they hold. Where interests already line up (the Finance Ministry needs working banks; exporters need ports and tariffs before 2029; outside lenders and buyers have deadlines; a leader who hopes to finish a term needs a working economy) the plan has support. Where they do not (reforms that limit the executive; campus reform that touches the student wings of both governing and opposition parties) it is weaker.
The evidence against feasibility is concrete. Parliament reviewed 133 interim-era ordinances: 110 were approved, 7 repealed and 16 lapsed, and those lost included the ones on judicial appointments, the Supreme Court secretariat, police reform and anti-corruption oversight; as of mid-October no police commission existed and the anti-corruption commission had reverted to its 2004 law.2 (See strategy and deals.)
The governing party has also done things this year that point the other way: members gave up government plots and duty-free cars, parliament repealed the clause that would have let former bank owners reclaim banks, and the army is being withdrawn from street policing.4 These show change is possible when the public is watching.
Confidence in political feasibility is low
This is the single judgement most readers should hold loosely. If both the outside deadlines and the leadership’s own interests fail, the realistic fallback is islands of effectiveness: a few ports, zones, courts and the central bank run well while the broader system stays as it is. That is still worth doing, and it is where the plan starts.
What is still unknown
- The total size of extortion: only fragments by sector exist.
- Party finance: what elections cost and how parties fund themselves.
- How many cadres there are, and what they earn. This sets the cost of the cadre-to-career deal.
- What madrasa graduates earn, and whether religiosity is rising or falling (a 2013 survey is the only comparable trend point found; a January 2025 Pew survey on religion and governance exists but was not reviewed or compared3).
- The true size of GDP: the national accounts were rated “C” by the IMF in January 2026, and growth in 2009-2019 may have been overstated. Estimates of the size of the economy differ widely (see the disputed figures).
- The cost of each deal, except the bank clean-up and the pay scale.
- Whether apprenticeship and public-works schemes work in Bangladesh (not yet searched).
- Agriculture, climate, health systems, urbanisation and automation in garments are outside most of the research and need their own pages.
Figures that disagree
Several figures have more than one source value, and some differences come from period or definition rather than from rival measurements of the same thing. - Growth, FY26: 3.4% (World Bank) against 4.14% (BBS), the same year, different estimators.1 The national accounts were rated “C” by the IMF in January 2026. - Poverty: 22.5% for FY26 (a World Bank projection) against 27.93% for 2025 (the PPRC survey); poverty lines and methods differ, so the two are not directly comparable.1 - Female labour-force participation: 38.4% in 2024 on the national definition against 21.3% in 2022 on the ILO 19th ICLS definition; different years and definitions.1 - Qawmi madrasa enrolment: about 1.4 million to about 5 million, an anonymous board estimate at the top end. - Mob killings, January-September 2026: 40 (Home Ministry) against 171-187 (rights groups), the same period, different counting. All are listed with sources on disputed figures.
What this means for readers
If you think a score is wrong or a deal too costly or too timid, you are doing what this page asks. Change the assumption, and see whether the order of work changes. Where it does not, you have found something robust. Where it does, you have found something worth testing, and later iterations of this site will add ways for readers to take part. For the plan itself see the path forward.
-
Prothom Alo on the World Bank, FY26 outlook; TBS, BBS FY26 growth; Prothom Alo, poverty survey; UN Women, gender lens; IANS, mob violence report; Bonik Barta, Qawmi enrolment. ↩↩↩
-
Al Jazeera, Is Bangladesh killing reforms introduced after student-led protests?; Financial Express, a year after July Charter signing. ↩
-
Pew Research Center, What role should religion play in Muslim- and Jewish-majority countries? (2025). ↩
-
CPD, Six Months of the Government (MPs gave up plots and duty-free cars); Dhaka Tribune, bank resolution amendment passed; Dhaka Tribune, army to return to barracks. ↩
Go deeper
- Objections, critique and what remains unknownIn depthThe strongest arguments against the plan and what survives each, the political-feasibility weakness, proposals examined from earlier work, the tests any one-cause explanation must pass, and the gaps in the evidence.
- Disputed figuresData & sourcesThe ledger of figures where our sources disagree, with both values, the likely reason and how this site handles each, plus a list of known gaps.
- SourcesData & sourcesThe consolidated bibliography of every external source cited in our research, grouped by type and deduplicated, with the links as given.
Where this comes from
Synthesised from 4 research reports, checked against the sources cited above and reviewed before publication. How we work · All sources.